This rebuttal responds to the "Report on CNN Broadcast ‘Valley of Death’" by attorneys Floyd Abrams and David Kohler dated July 2, 1998 (the "AK Report"). The AK Report, prepared in less than two weeks, on our eight month investigation contains numerous significant inaccuracies, mistakes and omissions. The AK Report is thin on detail, and shows a weak and superficial understanding of the facts upon which the broadcast was based. It makes unsupported propositions regarding the credibility of sources, appears to rely on third party reporting, virtually ignores the most significant confirming and corroborating statements from sources, and repeatedly proposes ambiguities which are at odds with any common sense reading of the interview transcripts.
Before broadcast, CNN’s top management gave both Tailwind stories (aired on June 7 and June 14, 1998) and their producers its full backing and support. They then withdrew that support and fired us. These actions have profound and far reaching implications for this kind of difficult and serious journalism. We hope that every thoughtful journalist with an interest in this controversy will take the time to read both the AK Report and this response in full before coming to any conclusions.
The most serious problems with the AK Report fall into three main categories, and the following represent the most significant of its deficiencies, which are more fully enumerated in the body of our response:
1. METHOD OF PREPARATION OF THE AK REPORT
(a) INDEPENDENCE. The AK Report has been widely touted as an "independent" report. One glance at the cover confirms that it is nothing of the sort. The co-author of the AK Report is David Kohler, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of CNN. The other co-author, Floyd Abrams, was hired and paid by CNN.
(b) CONFLICT OF INTEREST. David Kohler, the co-author of the AK Report, has a glaring conflict of interest, not only because he reports to members of CNN senior management who approved the Tailwind broadcasts, but also because he himself reviewed and approved both broadcasts and involved himself in the editorial decisions on those broadcasts as CNN General Counsel. Mr. Kohler involved himself in the editorial decisions at CNN CEO Tom Johnson’s request in order, according to Mr. Kohler, to provide Mr. Johnson with comfort about the broadcasts.
The AK Report itself suggests that it is designed to absolve CNN management, including Mr. Kohler, of any responsibility. Following a brief introduction, the AK Report states that "[s]ince this report is highly critical of the reporting on Operation Tailwind, it may be useful to set forth at the outset precisely what information CNN news management understood supported the underlying conclusions of the broadcast." (emphasis added.) Not only does the AK Report fail to "precisely" set forth all of the information contained in the briefing book prepared for CNN’s senior management, but it does not explain why in a report highly critical of the reporting of a broadcast "it may be useful" to set forth management’s understanding of the broadcast. Management’s understanding is relevant only if the report was designed to absolve management of responsibility.
(c) FAIRNESS AND DUE PROCESS. For nearly two weeks following the second broadcast we were gagged by CNN from talking to the press. During that time, CNN hired Floyd Abrams, we were told, to counsel us on First Amendment rights and the protection of our confidential sources. We met with Mr. Abrams for an aggregate combined total of less than three hours over a three-day period (June 23, 24 and 25), largely to discuss confidential sources. During this period, patently inaccurate factual statements were widely circulating in the press that have now become accepted as established fact by the journalistic community, the public, and, in some instances, even by the authors of the AK Report. At Mr. Kohler’s request, we provided a 19-page memorandum responding to some of the criticisms that had been made of the broadcast in the press. This memorandum did not address, and was not intended to address, many aspects of our sourcing.
Mr. Abrams and Mr. Kohler told us that we would be interviewed after they had reviewed the transcripts and videotapes upon which the broadcast was based. We were never interviewed as promised. Mr. Abrams has attempted to dodge their failure to interview us by saying he and Mr. Kohler relied on their brief meetings with us and the 19-page memorandum. Neither their brief meetings with us before they reviewed the transcripts nor the 19-page memorandum could in any way match interviewing us directly after the transcripts were read and the tapes screened. This defies any notion of a fair and complete investigation.
Finally, Mr. Abrams and Mr. Kohler broke their commitment to allow us to comment and object to the draft of their report before it was released.
We were tried, convicted and sentenced in a closed proceeding that failed any test of fairness or due process. Mr. Abrams and Mr. Kohler broke their word throughout the investigation. We were star chambered.
(d) HASTE. Over the course of eight months, our reporting generated thousands of pages of transcripts and many videotaped interviews. The AK Report took less than two weeks. This is not enough time to make a proper assessment of the information we received, as this Rebuttal will show. We do not know how much of the written material the authors of the AK Report reviewed (they do not say), but to our knowledge, of all the videotaped interviews, Mr. Abrams and Mr. Kohler only requested to see those with Admiral Moorer and Lieutenant Van Buskirk. If so, this is inadequate. Any review of Captain McCarley’s videotaped interview, for example, makes clear the manner in which he answered our questions and casts a red light on his credibility that is not evident from a mere review of his transcripts.
(e) NO JOURNALISTIC REVIEW. The authors of the AK report are both attorneys, not journalists. Prior to the issuance of the AK Report, we requested that a journalism dean replace Mr. Kohler and be appointed as a co-author, but this request was ignored. Much of CNN’s post-retraction coverage has concentrated on the assertion that the broadcast did not have "proof." Since when is this the journalistic standard? Even in a criminal court of law the standard is not absolute proof, but proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A review of this Rebuttal will show that we had an enormous amount of confirming, corroborating and supporting information for the broadcast, sufficient to justify its going to air.
(f) BREACH OF CONFIDENCES. In the AK Report, against our vigorous protests, Mr. Abrams and Mr. Kohler have disclosed sources in breach of confidentiality obligations undertaken by us on behalf of CNN in the course of our investigation. CNN and Messrs. Abrams and Kohler thus knowingly broke one of the most important tenets of journalism — protect your sources.
2. MAJOR DEFICIENCIES OF THE AK REPORT
The AK Report is littered with thin analysis, misstatements and inaccuracies. We list some examples below.
(a) SELECTIVE INFORMATION. The AK Report virtually ignores much of the most important information and attempts to discredit the many important sources that supported the story. At the same time, it ignores information that undermines the credibility or statements of three men on the mission whose statements the AK Report characterizes as denying the story. In fact, any review of the statements made by these sources prior to broadcast will show that their statements were self-contradictory and in many instances supported the story. We will cite five examples of the presentation of selective information by the AK Report, but there are many more set forth in this Rebuttal.
Moorer’s May Interview: The AK Report devotes a full 12‡ of its 54 pages to quotes from the first off-camera interview with Admiral Moorer in December 1997, and the follow up on-camera interview the very next month, in January 1998. The quotes are set forth non-sequentially in the AK Report, which substantially distorts their content. However, the AK Report virtually ignores the third and most important interview with the Admiral in May 1998, referring to it in only a single paragraph on page 29 of the AK Report. In that third off-camera interview with April Oliver, Admiral Moorer was asked whether killing defectors was the mission in Tailwind and replied "I have no doubt about that." In that interview, he also clearly and unambiguously confirmed that sarin nerve gas was "by and large" available for search and rescue missions, that it was "definitely available" in the Vietnam War and that it saved American lives in Laos. None of these confirmations are even given passing mention in the AK Report which concludes that none of Moorer’s statements are "sufficiently clear to be relied upon as a true confirmation or anything like it." We have consequently felt it necessary to quote Admiral Moorer’s actual words extensively in this Rebuttal. (We invite journalists to read the quotes from that interview, not referenced by the AK Report, which are set forth on pages 14 to 19 of this Rebuttal.)
Moorer’s Pre-Broadcast Approval and Post-Broadcast Statement: Six days before the broadcast aired, after his three interviews, Admiral Moorer read and approved the script of the broadcast which plainly states that he confirms that nerve gas was used and that defectors were the target. This extraordinary final approval by Admiral Moorer exceeds any normal journalistic standard of confirmation. Even after the controversy over the story broke, Admiral Moorer stated three more times that he did indeed confirm to April Oliver that sarin nerve gas was used on Tailwind and more widely on search and rescue missions. These three further confirmations took place in the presence of both Jack Smith and April Oliver and are reflected in their notes of that meeting. Incredibly, the AK Report refers to Moorer’s approval of the script as a "potential confirmation." The day after the initial broadcast, the Pentagon faxed Admiral Moorer a statement headed, "Statement by Admiral Thomas Moorer, USN (ret.)" which said "In my discussions with CNN, I did not confirm the use of Sarin gas by U.S. military forces during Operation Tailwind." (emphasis added.) Admiral Moorer amended this statement to say "I did not authorize the use of Sarin gas by U.S. military forces during Operation Tailwind." (emphasis added.) The AK Report makes no mention of this. Clearly, Admiral Moorer himself believed that he had confirmed the use of sarin gas on Tailwind to CNN, even though the authors of the AK Report resolutely do not.
Captain McCarley’s Credibility: Captain McCarley was the commanding officer of the commando company on the ground and appeared and spoke five times during the initial broadcast. The AK Report states that more prominence should have been given to Captain McCarley. The AK Report ignores totally the facts (1) that because McCarley was wounded early Van Buskirk, not McCarley, led the attack on the base camp, called for the gas (the "baddest of the bad"), and was chosen to brief General Creighton Abrams on the operation, (2) that McCarley made numerous contradictory statements regarding the gas, including "[i]t very well could have been nerve gas," not referred to in the AK Report, and (3) that McCarley stands ready to deny that the US military was ever in Laos at all, stating in an on-camera interview that:
"IF OPERATING ACROSS BORDER [INTO LAOS] IS CONSIDERED UNETHICAL OR DENIABLE, THEN I RECKON I’M DENYING IT."
In other words, McCarley stands ready to deny everything relating to operations in Laos by the U.S. military. This pronouncement, nowhere referred to in the AK Report, cuts to the very heart of McCarley’s lack of credibility on Tailwind. It is worthy of note, given the allegations that we "fell in love with the story" and minimized contradictory information, that we chose not to emphatically discredit McCarley and omitted from the broadcast his statement of deniability of all matters pertaining to Laos.
Medic Rose’s Credibility: Similarly, the AK Report states that our failure to use the medic, Gary Rose, in the broadcast is "troubling." The AK Report uncritically refers to Rose’s post-broadcast remarks that the gas was CS tear gas. As with McCarley, information undermining Rose’s credibility on this issue is entirely ignored by the AK Report. In fact, Rose initially adamantly denied that any gas at all was used at all on extraction from Operation Tailwind and stated that the only reason he donned his gas mask on the extraction was to protect his face from "crap" kicked up by the helicopter’s blades. In that initial interview, Rose said that earlier on in the day, prior to extraction, there had been a liquid gas that "burned like hell" and may have been a liquid version of CS. In later conversations, he changed his position, saying that the gas was "incapacitating," that a liquid gas was used on extraction that was "a lot stronger" than CS gas, and was definitely not CS gas. He said "it was awful stuff." Rose also said that he was not saying the gas couldn’t be GB, that maybe he was far enough away to not get a heavy dose of it, that his physiology might be somewhat resistant to it and that the tall elephant grass might have filtered it out. This was the state of Rose’s information at the time of the broadcast. Against this background, we decided not to invite Rose for an on-camera interview because of his inconsistency. In addition, in the week preceding the broadcast, Rose told the Associate Producer of the broadcast that he wouldn’t have known what the gas was since he came to the landing zone last as he was with all the wounded. Furthermore, in a post-broadcast conversation with that Associate Producer, he made no complaint other than that we had shown the wrong gas mask on the broadcast (the masks they had used had internal, not external, filters). Rose then proceeded to volunteer that the broadcast had reminded him that he was told to take extra atropine (the sarin nerve gas antidote) with him on the mission. Later still after the broadcast, he finally came to the position mentioned uncritically and without context in the AK Report that this was, in fact, tear gas. Reading the AK Report, one would believe that Rose’s statements were clear, consistent and credible. They were none of these.
Pilot Bishop’s Statements: One of the Tailwind pilots, Art Bishop stated that he believes he dropped tear gas, not nerve gas. The AK Report states that the pilot Art Bishop "strongly disputed" the proposition that he might not have known what gas he was flying. However, in an e-mail to April Oliver (not referenced by the AK Report), Bishop states, "it could have been popcorn" that he was flying on Tailwind. Two Air Force commanders told us that the pilots would have no need to know what they were carrying. In an off-camera interview, Bishop also says in relation to the possibility that someone was flying nerve gas, "Who am I to say it isn’t true." He goes on to say, ""as I recall the story we were given was that it was tear gas. If we had nerve gas at NKP, it would have been really hard to take care of. I never heard about it. Course there was tight security there. And you can never really go by what you are told." We included Bishop’s statement that he was briefed and believed it was tear gas in the report sent to CNN in Atlanta. Against our most forceful protests, Bishop’s statement was taken out of our final cut by CNN executives in Atlanta due to the time constraints resulting from Rick Kaplan’s insertion of a contextual paragraph at the beginning of the broadcast. Substance was sacrificed by Atlanta management for Mr. Kaplan’s attempt at color.
(b) UNSUPPORTED PROPOSITIONS. The AK Report’s authors attack the information given by important confirming sources, not based on what the sources said, but based on unsupported attacks on the sources’ credibility and one-sided interpretations of what the sources said.
Moorer’s Mental Awareness: The AK Report says that Admiral Moorer "will be 87 next month," "lives in an assisted-care retirement home" and that the authors have "concerns about his age." The clear insinuation is that Admiral Moorer is somehow mentally impaired by reason of his age and where he lives. For the record, Admiral Moorer lives with his wife in a luxurious and elegant retirement home. He is healthy and active enough to play golf. April Oliver has spent many hours with Admiral Moorer, not on the telephone, but in person in dignified and courteous interviews. She has found him to be totally lucid with excellent recall of the events of the time. Any reading of the transcripts or review of his interview on videotape makes that self-evident. Even the AK Report concedes that Admiral Moorer’s "memory remains satisfactory." His recollection of the statements he had made to Oliver was so accurate, in fact, that he was able to challenge the one word in the draft text of the broadcast with which he took issue. The Admiral correctly recalled that he had not used the word "scores" to describe the number of American defectors in Vietnam — he in fact had said that "[23] is too low and [300] too high." He subsequently agreed that "scores" was an acceptable paraphrase. Admiral Moorer’s telephone manner does not lend itself to the quick-reaction daily journalism that requires an immediate five second soundbite, and it is hardly surprising that he has not been called on by CNN to comment on "ongoing issues" since the early 1990s as he has been retired for over twenty years. Contrary to the AK Report, this is not a "credibility issue." We invite journalists to read Moorer’s statements and review his videotaped interview and reach their own conclusions as to his clarity of mind and memory. If the authors of the AK Report have any evidence at all that suggests that Admiral Moorer is mentally infirm or feeble, they should abide by the same standards they espouse in the AK Report and come forward with it. Otherwise, they should not seek to discredit him with this type of insinuation, which has taken on a life of its own in the press.
Van Buskirk’s Repressed Memory: The AK Report states as uncontroverted fact that Lieutenant Van Buskirk "has, in spectacularly self-destructive fashion, stated that he had repressed memory syndrome which he only overcame while speaking with Oliver." The AK Report goes on to state that "recent reports that [Van Buskirk] attributes to repressed memory his previous failure to recall the encounter with defectors as he now describes it makes continued reliance upon him all the more problematic." This allegation appears to arise from a third party report by Newsweek magazine. Van Buskirk calls it "hogwash."
We do not know, but would be interested to learn, what steps were taken by the authors of the AK Report to confirm the accuracy of Newsweek’s report. We would hope that they checked this allegation thoroughly before setting it forth in a publicly issued report with such radical consequences, but unfortunately that does not seem to be the case. Elementary inquiries or investigation would have raised serious questions about the allegation’s accuracy.
The notes from the first cold call made by Oliver to Van Buskirk in October 1997 make it clear that he did not suffer from repressed memory. In that call he references both his killing of a Caucasian who cursed at him in perfect English and the use of a lethal nerve gas. In that initial cold call, Van Buskirk stated that the Caucasian who cursed in English was a "Russian adviser," but in later conversations stated that he believed then and now that the Caucasian was, in fact, an American. This is not something he might be thought likely to reveal in an initial cold call given, as he later revealed, that his commander had told him not to discuss the incident, not to include the killing in his after action report and that the Caucasian was probably a Russian with perfect English.
Newsweek reporter, Evan Thomas, wrote the article alleging that Van Buskirk suffered from repressed memory. We have been told by Thomas that Van Buskirk answered affirmatively a question put to him by Thomas in which Thomas (not Van Buskirk) introduced the term repressed memory. By the AK Report’s own standards (which it appears to apply selectively), and by any reasonable standard, this falls far short of being a statement by Van Buskirk that he suffers from "repressed memory."
Our "Deeply Held Beliefs." The authors of the AK Report state, without any support whatsoever, that the "thesis" of the Tailwind broadcast reflected our "deeply held beliefs." Messrs. Abrams and Kohler have never spoken to us about this proposition of theirs which we find to be an offensive slur on our journalistic integrity. We did not have a "thesis" with respect to Tailwind. The broadcast reflected deeply researched reporting rather than our beliefs. We reported what numerous men all along the chain of command told us.
(c) ONE-SIDED INTERPRETATIONS. The AK Report is littered with one-sided interpretations. We will cite three examples here:
What McCarley Said: The AK Report cites the accuracy of April Oliver’s notes with great approval, and, indeed, relies "upon many of those passages as a basis for our criticism of the broadcast." McCarley is the only interviewee to our knowledge who denies he said what is in Oliver’s contemporaneous notes of his interview. Rather than acknowledging that McCarley’s denials cast doubts upon his credibility, and notwithstanding the authors’ willingness to pass judgment on the credibility of Van Buskirk and Moorer on far less evidence, the authors of the AK Report feel "unable to pass judgment" on this issue. Further and even more egregiously, despite this purported inability to pass judgment, the AK Report goes on to set forth McCarley’s post-broadcast position without referencing and contrasting that position to Oliver’s contemporaneous notes. These notes include McCarley’s statements:
"It very well could have been nerve gas." "It wouldn’t surprise me to find out that a lethal nerve gas was used." "It is very possible [that nerve gas was used]. I can’t confirm or deny. I would have no problems with it being used."
None of these statements is referenced anywhere in the AK Report.
Van Buskirk’s Book: The authors conclude that Van Buskirk’s book mentions a gas, "arguably in terms inconsistent with sarin." Although we place no weight on the description of the gas in the book (which is about Van Buskirk’s voyage of personal discovery and devotes only one chapter of 25 pages describing the events of Operation Tailwind), the gas symptoms actually described there (nausea, bending over and vomiting) are more consistent with sarin, and more arguably inconsistent with tear gas dispersed in an open area.
Confidential Source: Taking another example, we invite journalists to read the quotes from a confidential source set forth on pages 26 and 27 of this Rebuttal (and in the AK Report, pp. 36 — 38), and to ask themselves whether any fair reading of that passage demonstrates the source "may be responding in a hypothetical fashion" as the authors conclude. This is an extraordinary conclusion.
(d) MISREPRESENTATIONS: The AK Report contains a number of misrepresentations of information. One flagrant example is set forth in this introduction.
Van Buskirk’s Supposed Reference in Early Interviews to Tear Gas: The AK Report states that in early interviews:
"Van Buskirk repeatedly refers to the gas as CBU-19 which, as he acknowledges, was a tear gas weapon."
In later interviews, the AK Report states, "[Van Buskirk] appears to become more certain of the lethal nature of the gas used." This, they conclude, damages his credibility. This is an extraordinary misrepresentation of what Van Buskirk said in his early interviews, and calls into question the bona fides of the AK Report. The following are some quotes from Van Buskirk in his initial cold call interview with April Oliver:
"I didn’t really talk about the gas [in my book] because it was too top secret. It was delivered in CBU-19s." "That stuff they put in the CBU-19s it made us sick." "The rest of the enemy all died from the gas." "Oh, yeah, it was lethal war gas. Course they don’t tell us too much."
In the same initial cold call interview, he also describes the symptoms of those exposed to the gas in some detail, including a description of the enemy "laying down to die."
"My unit puked their brains out. We all got amoebic dysentery. Everyone’s nose ran and all this mucous started coming out of everyone’s nostrils. Lots of enemy started having seizures…."
These are not tear gas symptoms.
It is absolutely clear that in this initial cold call Van Buskirk is talking about a lethal gas. He is not talking about tear gas and later changing his story to lethal gas, as the AK Report asserts.
[Note: At a meeting in October 1997 after the initial cold call, Van Buskirk took April Oliver aside and told her that the call sign wasn’t 19, it was more like CBU 15 or 16. The confusion may have arisen because of the military’s subordinate designation of sarin nerve gas, BLU-19.]
3. ONE-SIDED REPORTING?
Perhaps the strongest single criticism of the broadcast by the AK Report was that CNN presented views consistent with its own conclusions and neglected or minimized conflicting views. The AK Report accuses us of being guilty of "journalistic overkill," a baseless accusation that we totally reject. The Tailwind broadcasts were based upon confirmations, corroborations and additional support from our multiple sources, including soldiers on the ground, pilots and senior commanders in a position to know what transpired in Operation Tailwind. These sources spoke clearly and openly in spite of having every reason for denial.
The AK Report authors feel competent to judge, without having interviewed either of us on the subject and ignoring indications to the contrary (such as our refusal to emphatically discredit Captain McCarley with his own words and our attempts to include the pilot, Bishop), that the broadcast reflected our "deeply held beliefs." This has led to unfounded allegations in the media (and even, most extraordinarily, from Rick Kaplan, President of CNN America, who approved the broadcast) that we "fell in love with the story." This is simply not true. We are experienced journalists who are agnostics with respect to each and every story we report. In September 1997, April Oliver produced a story very favorable to the Studies and Observations Group ("SOG") which was widely greeted with approval by the US military. After that broadcast, a Pentagon press official called to compliment the program as a tribute to men of courage. We repeat - in the Tailwind broadcasts we intentionally omitted information that would have destroyed the credibility of McCarley. In addition, we included Bishop’s statement in the final cut sent to Atlanta. With this story, as with others, we followed the leads where they took us and uncovered the confirming, corroborating and supporting information upon which the story was based.
We have always been aware of contradictory information regarding nerve gas and defectors. We sought interviews with many who might contradict the story, including former National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger (he did not return our calls or letters), former CIA Director Richard Helms (who said he did not know anything about it), former SOG commander, John Sadler (who told us our request, one of four, was in the trash can), and a former CIA station chief (who did not want to go on camera). Had any of these potential sources spoken, their views would have been aired. (A list of those approached is set forth in Attachment 1 to this Rebuttal).
We provided a 156-page briefing book summarizing for senior CNN management the sourcing basis for the broadcast. That briefing book contained a 35-page section discussing those individuals who claimed either that nerve gas was not used or that the mission was not to kill American defectors. We made it clear to CNN management that the report would be very controversial and we wrote a three page memorandum to management at CNN and Time magazine specifically outlining the individuals and groups likely to criticize the broadcast. We requested one hour in which to present the story, both pro and con, in a fuller form, but were told by the broadcast’s executive producer and first deputy that it would have to be a magazine report running fourteen minutes. In the end it was given eighteen minutes.
The briefing book was sent to Executive Producer, Pamela Hill, in Atlanta for distribution to CNN senior management, including CNN CEO, Tom Johnson, CNN America President, Rick Kaplan, and CNN Senior Vice President and General Counsel and co-author of the AK Report, David Kohler. All were fully aware of the controversial nature of the story and the likely outcry and nevertheless approved the broadcast.
As the newly emerging criticisms of the story built after the broadcast, Rick Kaplan on Thursday, June 18, 1998 said that we should now produce a one-hour broadcast to present the opposing views of Tailwind. We stood ready with our colleagues on NewsStand to produce that broadcast. Rick Kaplan subsequently directed us to drop that project.
In a June 18 meeting, Rick Kaplan said this was a public relations problem, not a journalism problem and that he did not want this controversy to progress to congressional hearings with "3,000" members of the establishment on one side of the room and CNN and members of the Special Forces on the other. During that same meeting, Kaplan and Johnson expressed their concern about the pressure they were receiving from Henry Kissinger and Colin Powell and the threat of a cable boycott by veterans groups.
During that time, Kaplan and Johnson gagged us from publicly defending the broadcast, and pulled Pamela Hill and Jack Smith from a scheduled appearance on CNN’s "Reliable Sources" program. Nevertheless, CNN continued to air unopposed criticism about the broadcast without any fairness or balance on the "Reliable Sources" program and with a news report from the Special Forces convention.
During the same period, Tom Johnson ordered us to the Pentagon to assist the Pentagon’s Public Affairs Office with its investigation of Operation Tailwind. That meeting took place on Monday, June 22.
In the end, we were fired.
We stand by our reporting and producing of both Tailwind stories.
INTRODUCTION
The AK Report sets forth its basic conclusion "that although the broadcast was prepared after exhaustive research, was rooted in considerable supportive data, and reflected the deeply held beliefs of the CNN journalists who prepared it, the central thesis of the broadcast could not be sustained at the time of the broadcast itself and cannot be sustained now" and that "CNN’s conclusion that United States troops used nerve gas during the Vietnamese conflict on a mission in Laos designed to kill American defectors is insupportable." (AK Report, pp. 1-2, emphasis added).
The AK Report’s conclusions misrepresent the story. The story neither contained a thesis, nor reached a conclusion. Rather, consistent with our role as journalists, our report told the stories that were told to us. Throughout our report, we made clear that the story was based on statements by soldiers, airmen and military officials.
Furthermore, we, the producers of the story, disagree with the AK Report’s conclusion and with numerous particulars set forth in the AK Report. The AK Report is based on an inadequate and one-sided investigation and a misrepresentation of the information relied on by us. We are journalists. We followed up on leads, took them wherever they led us, and received confirmation, corroboration and support for the two central points of the broadcast: the use of nerve gas on Operation Tailwind and the mission of killing American defectors. This was not the argument of a thesis or the statement of a conclusion; it was what the men with knowledge of the operation and the secret war in Laos told us. As the AK Report notes:
"Men engaging in such activities, even under orders, would be unlikely to disclose them. When those same people have been trained to participate in black operations and to conceal those operations long after they were concluded, the process of newsgathering about them is all the more difficult." (AK Report, p. 4)
Following the shallow conclusions of the AK Report and CNN’s actions, such reporting will henceforth be far more difficult.
ADMIRAL THOMAS MOORER
Admiral Moorer by his words and actions stands as a confirming source for the use of nerve gas on Tailwind and the killing of defectors as the mission’s objective. Any sequential, common sense reading of Admiral Moorer’s three interviews makes that perfectly clear.
A sequential reading of Admiral Moorer’s transcripts shows that when he first met with April Oliver he was uncertain how much he wanted to cooperate or divulge. In his second interview, he provided more information and gave the following confirmation:
"Q. So isn’t it fair to say in light of all this, everything we’ve talked about, that Tailwind proved that CBU-15 GB is an effective weapon?
A. Yes, I think, but I think that was already known. Otherwise it never would have been manufactured."
Then, in his third interview in May 1998, Admiral Moorer provided still further information and added a further chain of confirmations (these are set forth below, since they are not referenced in the AK Report).
Admiral Moorer became a four-square confirming source on June 2, 1998, when, in the presence of April Oliver, he read and approved the script which plainly stated that he confirmed nerve gas use and killing defectors. This final approval by Admiral Moorer exceeds any normal journalistic standard of confirmation.
Admiral Moorer read and approved the story.
Admiral Moorer stands as a confirming source.
Admiral Moorer’s Credibility
The authors of the AK Report state that Admiral Moorer, who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of Tailwind "will be 87 next month" and "lives in an assisted-care retirement home." They state that "CNN itself ceased calling on Admiral Moorer to appear to comment on ongoing issues in the early 1990s, and CNN’s Pentagon correspondent raised this credibility issue before the broadcast." [emphasis added] The AK Report goes on to state that the authors have "concerns about his age." (AK Report, p15)
This is an extraordinary character assassination which seems to be based on nothing more than Moorer’s age and a consequent unsubstantiated "credibility issue." Admiral Moorer has been retired for over twenty years. It is therefore hardly surprising that he has not been asked to comment on "ongoing issues" since the early 1990s. In addition, Admiral Moorer does not have a telephone manner for the type of quick-reaction daily journalism that requires an immediate five second soundbite.
We would be very interested to hear any evidence the authors of the AK Report have relating to Admiral Moorer’s credibility or mental capacity. If they have none, they should not seek to discredit him with this type of malignant insinuation, which has taken on a life of its own in the press.
April Oliver spent many hours with Admiral Moorer, nearly all of it in person, and found him to be totally lucid with excellent recall of the events during the Vietnam War. Even the authors of the AK Report concede that "his memory remains satisfactory." In addition, he is healthy and strong enough to play golf.
His memory and lucidity are in fact excellent, as any reading of his statements or review of his videotaped interview will show. His recollection of the statements he had made to Oliver were so accurate that he challenged the one word with which he took issue in the script of the broadcast. The Admiral correctly recalled that he had not used the word "scores" to describe the number of American defectors in Vietnam — he in fact had said that "[23] is too low and [300] too high." After discussing the word "scores" with Oliver, he confirmed that scores accurately reflected his estimate of the numbers of defectors.
The simple truth is that Admiral Moorer is a highly respected and distinguished retired military commander who was running the war in Vietnam at the time of Operation Tailwind and has excellent recall of the events of the time.
What Admiral Moorer Said
The AK Report states that Admiral Moorer was not "the powerful advocate for the program’s central thesis that it repeatedly suggests." The AK Report states that "[v]iewed as a whole, Admiral Moorer simply does not come close to offering the sort of support for the conclusions offered by CNN that the program asserts that he does." (AK Report, p. 16).
The AK Report then proceeds to quote at length (AK Report, pp. 16-28) from April Oliver’s initial interviews with Admiral Moorer (one off camera in December 1997, and the second on camera in January 1998). It quotes these passages out of sequential order so that their meaning is distorted. The AK Report concludes that "[t]aken as a whole, these passages cannot be said to constitute confirmation of the CNN broadcast." (AK Report, p. 24). These passages include Admiral Moorer’s confirming statement set forth above, and nothing that precedes or follows such statement indicates that this was not a confirmation. This dismissal of Admiral Moorer’s confirmation of the use of nerve gas and the killing of defectors is a conclusion lacking an explanation.
We did not, however, rely solely on this confirmation. We also relied on Admiral Moorer’s May off-camera interview and his reading and approval of the CNN script and the Time story to present him as a confirming source for our report. These are barely referenced in the AK Report. It is worthy of note, also, that even after the controversy arose after the broadcast, Admiral Moorer reaffirmed his confirmations three more times orally and once more in a written statement.
Certain confirmations received from Admiral Moorer were referenced in the AK Report. Others were not.
Confirmations by Admiral Moorer Referenced in the AK Report
The AK Report gives only passing reference to the following important exchange from the January 1998 interview, which is Admiral Moorer’s on-camera confirmation (emphasis added):
"Q. So isn’t it fair to say in light of all this, everything we’ve talked about, that Tailwind proved that CBU-15 GB is an effective weapon?
A. Yes, I think, but I think that was already known. Otherwise it never would have been manufactured."
The AK Report also gives only passing reference to Moorer’s statement in his May 1998 interview when asked whether "killing these defectors" was the mission, "Yeah, I have no doubt about that." The full exchange (not quoted in the AK Report) is as follows;
"Q. So killing these defectors was the mission? And it was done to protect American lives?
A. Yeah, I have no doubt about that. Now I was not looking through the field glasses. But I assume the information was corroborated somewhere and that the recon teams saw what they saw.
Q. And then the correct decision in your view was to eliminate them?
A. Yeah.
Q. Why not capture them?
A. Well you would have to examine that possibility. You would have to see if it was possible to capture them and bring them out. If it was impossible, then you can’t leave them out there. You would have to eliminate them.
Q. And elimination was successful in this case?
A. Yes. But again I do not remember exactly, but I do not think there was just one such incident. That there was a large group makes it a big incident. But again I do not remember the specifics of this action. I was aware of the fact that there was this objective in Laos."
Confirmations by Admiral Moorer Not Referenced in the AK Report
The following exchanges were inexplicably totally omitted from the AK Report, which quoted other portions of interviews liberally and with the AK Report’s subjective emphasis:
From the December 1997 off-camera interview, the AK Report quoted an extract of the following exchange, which we have set forth more fully here, with the sections selected by the AK Report in italics and the section omitted by the AK Report underlined. (AK Report, p. 27-28):
"Q. I think there is [sic] some historic issues at play here. If the US used nerve gas in combat in Vietnam, it is worthy to report. And it has some important policy implications for today, with the debate over the chemical weapons convention.
A. Treaties will never stop people from using this weapon. But you have said the important word — history. And that I can respect.
You have to use every resource in your command to win. The U.S. is the garden spot of the world and people here don’t understand how others live, or what it can take to win. I would have used any weapon, any tactic and any move to defend the security of the United States.
Q. So that would include GB, weaponized in the U.S. arsenal. We know there was four million pounds of it manufactured…and that it was stored at NKP.
A. (Nods yes). But you are not going to report that we were using some illegal weapon are you…because remember it wasn’t technically illegal yet…"
The following segment DIRECTLY follows the section quoted by the AK Report at the bottom of page 28 of the AK Report, but gives a very different impression to the selective quotes used by the AK Report:
"Q. Let me ask you this, in the interest of history, do you think it was a mistake not to get it [the use of nerve gas in Vietnam] out in the open earlier….It is seen as so taboo now, and it is hard for people even to discuss…
A. No! Not at all! And of course it is not so unique. The Germans used chlorine and other chemicals. The public at large found that horrible. And they would find this horrible too. I don’t think it should have come out any earlier.
Q. We are going to report the U.S. used nerve gas in combat during Tailwind. Will we be correct in saying this was the first time the U.S. used it?
A. You might want to qualify that a bit.
Q. How?
A. Well, I am not so familiar with the European theater. But I think there might have been a few isolated pockets where poison gas was used.
Q. You mean in World War II?
A. Yes.
Q. Really?
A. Yes, I think so.
Q. So we would be okay in saying first time in the Vietnam war?
A. Yes, I think so."
Incredibly, the AK Report makes no reference to this.
And later, in the May interview:
"Q. So you didn’t know the details about this operation before?
A. I did not before. Afterwards, yeah.
Q. Was it your understanding that the SOG team achieved their objective?
A. I don’t know about [the word] "achieve." I knew about the problem. And I knew when the operation was finished. I didn’t analyze the details. There was no hooray, hooray, we’ve won again.
Q. Now, about the mission completed. It’s got to be a difficult choice. On the one hand, those defectors are somebody’s father or child. On the other hand they are a huge military headache and need to be taken care of. Is there a moral choice here, any ambivalence?
A. I think the second attitude you describe is more like it. When you go into a fight it is life or death. You can’t ease up on an operation. You can’t go in with sentiment. You can’t go in with no drive and aggression. If you are going in and need to do a job, you really have to put your heart and soul into it. Otherwise you might get yourself killed if you are fighting only halfway. I suspect in general you participate tooth and nail.
Q. So you were aware the problem had been taken care of?
A. I don’t think I was ever given an after action report about that particular incident. After all these were only 10 or 15 soldiers out of 100,-000 or so. I do not remember the specifics. I do remember that it was executed, and it was finished.
Q. How can you be sure there were not POWs there? The hatchet force team was told to go in and shoot anything that moves. They wouldn’t be told that if there were POWs there, would they?
A. Now you are getting into the rules of engagement. Every combat force gets information on the rules of engagement. We had terrible rules of engagement during the Vietnam War. The rules of engagement tell you who to shoot and who not to shoot. Sometimes it comes down that alright, all targets are okay.
Q. And it must have been concluded that the target in this case were all defectors and not POWs?
A. Let’s say that they were evaluated and the conclusion was reached that they were defectors.
Q. On this specific operation [Tailwind]?
A. Yeah.
Q. Is our number of about 15 defectors killed about right?
A. I do not know for sure. You will have to talk to someone who was there. I do not know if there were 20 or 15. But there was a group."
Bear in mind that none of this was referred to in the AK Report which stated that "Admiral Moorer simply does not come close to offering the sort of support for the conclusions offered by CNN that the program asserts that he does."
From later in the May interview (the following passage is also NOT referenced by the AK Report):
"Q. We’ve been told, including by Singlaub [Major General John K. Singlaub, the chief SOG commanding officer in Saigon from 1966 to 1968], that killing defectors, that defectors were always a top priority target for SOG.
A. Yes, I think so. You can rely on Singlaub. He was heavy into this from the start. He would have no reason to misinform you. You can believe him. (see quotes from Singlaub below on page 62 of this Rebuttal).
Q. But the conventional forces might be more apt to take a defector prisoner [than SOG]…
A. It’s on a case by case basis. You get into the PR game here. You can’t have soldiers writing home, dear mom, yesterday I saw a defector and he was American but we had to shoot him. That would hit the papers sooner or later and LBJ would be mad.
Q. So a big PR problem?
A. Sure.
Q. So this was sensitive.
A. It’s very sensitive subject matter. Many mothers and fathers do not believe their sons would defect. If you kill a defector it’s a big PR problem.
Q. Because of the PR problem with defectors, that is why this operation [Tailwind] was given to a black operation like SOG?
A. Yeah.
Q. Isn’t [it] unusual to conduct such a large operation against a large group of defectors?
A. Yeah."
Later in the May interview the following exchange occurs:
"Q. I know this is a bit exacting, but I just want to make sure we know what we are talking about here. CBU-15 is GB is sarin is nerve gas. Agreed?
A. I think everybody knows that.
Q. Not everybody. Not some of the men on the ground. They know GB but they don’t know it’s sarin. Think they are just playacting?
A. I think everyone associated with those kinds of weapons knows their effects."
Moorer goes on to demonstrate a detailed operational knowledge of the tactics deployed in using sarin nerve gas on search and rescue ("SAR") missions.
The interview then goes on:
"Q. One pilot told me he flew the weapon [sarin nerve gas] 15 different times. There are 60 or so pilots at NKP who fly A1s. Could this weapon have been used more than a hundred times?
A. I don’t have the figure.
Q. But it was used a lot?
A. Then again did that pilot use it every time he flew it.
Q. I don’t know.
A. Well I can comfortably say that if a pilot was involved in a SAR operation, then he probably flew it. I think it could be useful in a lot of these operations. I am not aware of how many times it was used."
And later in the interview:
"Q. But it was always available on SARs?
A. By and large it was available yup. Whether or not it could be carried as easily as a 500 pound bomb, I don’t know."
The following exchange then takes place:
"Q. We have heard the weapon [sarin nerve gas] was generally available from ‘69 to ‘70….
A. I do not know the exact dates of the weapon in the area. I am not aware specifically. Let me say this. It was definitely available in the Vietnam War. This is a much bigger operation than you realize. It takes authorization to move the weapon into southeast Asia. That is only one step. And there are many steps to make it available to the pilots."
Moorer goes on to state, that "[I]f the weapon could save American lives, I would never hesitate to use it" and the following exchange takes place:
"Q. And it did save American lives in Laos.
A. Yes, uh hum.
Q How many American lives were saved by this weapon [sarin nerve gas]?
A. I would not want to speculate on that.
Q. Estimate? 100 or more?
A. Well, it wasn’t used every time a helicopter was shot down. I don’t know.
Q. Was it ever used in South Vietnam?
A. I do not recall using it in South Vietnam."
NONE of these passages is even referenced in the AK Report. In fact, the AK Report incorrectly states in a footnote on page 32 (emphasis added):
"As noted earlier, Admiral Moorer said that he believed that chemical weapons should be available for use in wartime, not that CBU-15 [sarin nerve gas] had been used. (emphasis added)." This is incorrect: see quotes from Admiral Moorer on pages 13 to 19 of this Rebuttal.
We find that conclusion extraordinary on any fair and full reading of the transcripts, even without regard to Admiral Moorer’s pre- and post-broadcast approvals, and his later statement in which he said:
"I did not authorize the use of Sarin gas by U.S. military forces during Operation Tailwind in Laos in September 1970. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, I had no documents, operational orders, after action reports or knowledge of the use of Sarin. However, later, in general discussions, I learned of the operation, including verbal statements indicating the use of Sarin on the Tailwind mission."
Admiral Moorer’s Approval of the Broadcast
Supplementing all of Admiral Moorer’s prior confirmations in his interviews is his subsequent approval of the entire script for the broadcast, an extraordinary journalistic step to assure accuracy. The script Admiral Moorer read clearly states that "Moorer confirmed that nerve gas was used in Tailwind" and that "Moorer acknowledged in an off-camera interview that Tailwind’s target was indeed defectors." This approval took place six days before the broadcast, and Admiral Moorer spent approximately twenty to thirty minutes reviewing both the script and the Time magazine article prior to approving them.
The AK Report states that "Moorer now claims he had it in his hands for ‘about five minutes - - I thumbed through it, but I didn’t read it.’" That is simply not accurate and we are unaware of the circumstances in which and the person to whom Admiral Moorer allegedly made this statement. Messrs. Abrams and Kohler should state who gave them that information. Was it Moorer himself? Or is it another third party report? Admiral Moorer did in fact spend approximately 20 to 30 minutes reading the script and the Time magazine article. Admiral Moorer’s careful reading of the script is evidenced by his comment regarding the use of the word "scores," before agreeing that this was an appropriate way to paraphrase his response.
After Admiral Moorer had reviewed and approved the script, April Oliver offered to bring a final cut of the TV report for him to screen before it went to air. Admiral Moorer replied that that was not necessary.
What more definitive confirmation can there be than a confirmation of the accuracy of the script by a source reading and agreeing with its content? This is given passing and dismissive reference in the AK Report as a "potential confirmation." As any journalist knows, when a source is given a read-back of what he says and agrees with its accuracy, that constitutes a hard confirmation.
Admiral Moorer was contacted by the Pentagon after the broadcast. On Monday, June 8, 1998, the day after the broadcast aired, the Pentagon faxed him a statement, headed "Statement by Admiral Thomas Moorer, USN (ret.)," which said:
"In my discussions with CNN I did not confirm the use of sarin gas by U.S. military forces during Operation Tailwind in Laos in September 1970. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, I had no documents, operational orders, after action reports or knowledge of the use of Sarin."
In our presence, Admiral Moorer amended this statement to say:
"I did not authorize the use of Sarin gas [rather than the suggested wording on the Pentagon fax, "In my discussions with CNN I did not confirm the use of Sarin gas…"] by U.S. military forces during Operation Tailwind in Laos in September 1970. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, I had no documents, operational orders, after action reports or knowledge of the use of Sarin. However, I later learned of the operation, including the use of nerve gas on the mission."
Clearly Admiral Moorer himself knew that he had confirmed the use of sarin gas to CNN, even if the authors of the AK Report do not. The authors of the AK Report inexplicably make no reference to this amendment.
After Admiral Moorer had amended the statement to read as set forth above, he went to make a telephone call with the revised fax in hand. When he returned, we observed that he had penned in the word "rumors" in the statement wile he was gone. After discussing what he had heard about the use of Sarin on Tailwind, Admiral Moorer agreed that these were not "rumors."
Admiral Moorer then re-drafted the statement, amending this sentence to read:
"However, later, in general discussions I learned of the operation, including verbal statements indicating the use of Sarin on the Tailwind mission."
At this post-broadcast meeting with us on June 8, 1998, Admiral Moorer AGAIN three times reconfirmed that sarin nerve gas was used on Operation Tailwind and more widely for search and rescue missions.
Jack Smith’s notes of that meeting with Admiral Moorer, after the broadcast had aired and Moorer had been in contact with the Pentagon’s Public Affairs Office, include the following passages:
"AM [Admiral Moorer] said that based on our report people he was hearing from were construing that he confirmed the use of sarin on TW [Tailwind] and in the SARs [Search and Rescue missions] as his authorizing its use on these missions, i.e., that he gave the orders directly to drop the gas.
This he did not do — directly order or authorize its use he told us. The order for its use came from "the commanders on the ground in the theater in the heat of battle." AM said he only came to learn of sarin being used at a later date while he was still the Chman of the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff].
AM said that since it was 28 years ago he could not remember who at the time told him that sarin had been used.
AM three times during our time with him said he did indeed confirm to AO [April Oliver] that sarin NG [nerve gas] was used on TW and more widely for S&Rs. AM emphasized that because he was the one on camera confirming the use of sarin, people were construing that he was the commander who authorized its use and ordered it dropped and that was what was bothering him because he was not the commander who was directly involved on TW — again he repeated it was the commander on the ground who gave the order. AM said people would now believe that he gave the order to drop poison gas.
AO and I reviewed w. AM that he had read carefully the script which had written in it that he confirmed that nerve gas was used in TW. AM agreed that he had confirmed it and had read his confirmation in the script and agreed with the accuracy of that statement when he read it before we broadcast the story.
But now he was being construed to be the one who ordered the poison gas dropped and he wanted to clarify that he was NOT — so he gave us the statement — the written statement — which is attached."
With respect to Admiral Moorer’s insertion of the word "rumors" in his statement, Jack Smith’s notes of the meeting of June 8, 1998 include the following:
"I said didn’t his people — officers — report to him the use of sarin. He said not in the strictest definition of a military report. He said the topic of nerve gas being used was talked about and discussed but not strictly in a military sense formally reported. I said to him that would not constitute rumors & AM agreed. AM said there were verbal statements regarding the use of sarin NG and his statement so reflects."
Against this background, the authors of the AK Report state that Admiral Moorer’s pre-broadcast review of the script and the post-broadcast statement must be given "some weight," but conclude that Admiral Moorer "simply does not come close to offering the sort of support for the conclusions offered by CNN that the program asserts that he does" and that he "never provided sufficient support for the broadcast to justify treating him as a confirming source." (AK Report, p. 16 and p. 31). The AK Report continues that, "Our conclusion, therefore, is that the substance of Admiral Moorer’s interviews do not confirm ‘that nerve gas was used in Tailwind’ or that the Tailwind ‘target was indeed defectors.’" (AK Report, p. 31).
In CNN’s retraction broadcast on July 5, Mr. Abrams said:
"..taken as a whole, I think the answer is, no, he did not confirm, and I think that was one of the greatest flaws of the broadcast."
This is a mistaken conclusion without foundation in the facts given the repeated confirmations provided by Admiral Moorer on these issues. We object to the selective information presented non-sequentially in the AK Report and to the disregard of Admiral Moorer’s support for, indeed, his confirmation of, our broadcast. According to any reasonable standard, his statements in his interviews, his pre-broadcast review and approval of the script of the broadcast and his post-broadcast statements and confirmations constitute substantial support for our use of Admiral Moorer as a confirming source for both of the key points of the broadcast, as well as for the additional point that sarin gas was widely available for search and rescue operations.
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES
As noted in the AK Report, in order to continue to protect the confidentiality of the confidential sources supporting the broadcast, certain information about confidential sources was not set forth in detail in the AK Report. (AK Report, p.1). Likewise, in order to protect our confidential sources, we will not provide specific information regarding such sources in this document.
The AK Report states that:
"confidential sources confirmed, to one degree or another, the validity of CNN’s broadcast. Taken together, they provided CNN’s journalists and news management with a good deal of comfort with respect to the accuracy of the broadcast. While that assessment was warranted to some degree, when the complete record is examined, the degree of reliance was perilous." (AK Report, p. 31)
MILITARY OFFICIAL
This confidential source is a military official who the AK Report acknowledges "has been highly placed for years," (AK Report, p. 31) and, in the words of the AK Report itself, is "particularly knowledgeable about chemical weaponry, [and] intimately familiar with nerve agents." (AK Report, p. 7). This source also has detailed knowledge of Operation Tailwind and SOG operations. He reviewed and approved the script for the Tailwind broadcast. His credibility is not attacked by the AK Report.
This confidential source was the original lead for the story. In a telephone call in September 1997, he acknowledged that an "agent" stronger than BZ (a hallucinogenic gas) was used in a mission to assist with the extraction of SOG commandos. He stated that "[g]iven the enemy’s nature, it [using this agent] was not an unscrupulous thing to do" thereby suggesting the forbidden nature of the weapon used. He said that the mission was more fully described in a book by John Plaster, a SOG veteran, and gave the chapter reference, which led us to the Tailwind operation.
This confidential source, like Admiral Moorer, ultimately reviewed and approved the script for the Tailwind broadcast, giving the "thumbs up" signal a number of times as he read it, including in particular with respect to the use of CBU-15 on Operation Tailwind.
With respect to this confidential source, the AK Report states that "[w]e have no doubt that the encouragement of this source properly gave all at CNN a sense of solidity about the story. This is particularly so since the source read the text of the broadcast in the presence of the producer and indicated specific approval of the references to CBU-15." (AK Report, p. 32, emphasis added). The AK Report, however, proceeds to state that "[t]here are serious weaknesses in this confirmation..." (AK Report, p.32).
The AK Report attempts to undercut the value of this source’s confirmation of the script of the broadcast by inaccurately suggesting that this source provided only "advice and guidance." In fact he provided specific confirmation that GB (sarin nerve gas) was used on Operation Tailwind and that killing defectors was always part of SOG’s mission.
The AK Report goes on to make the following two assertions.
First, the AK Report claims that "[t]he source, during [his final May 1998] meeting, appeared to be reasoning to the conclusion that it was not BZ used and that ‘it had to be nerve agent used,’ not basing his support on actual knowledge." (AK Report, p. 33).
This conclusion is inconsistent with the fact that this source was the original lead for the story, telling April Oliver months before this purported reasoning that an agent stronger than BZ was used on the mission. Moreover, the fact that during his final May 1998 meeting the source used non-verbal hand signals (i.e., thumbs up) to indicate his approval of the script of the broadcast suggests that the source was concerned that he was being taped and that he should be cautious in his verbal statements.
No reference is made to the following exchange from the May 1998 meeting in the AK Report (emphasis added):
"Q. Offensive use of nerve agent unusual?
A. I know of only one instance of this, this one [Tailwind]. There could be others but I don’t think it was widespread. (emphasis added)"
This exchange represents actual knowledge, not reasoning.
Another exchange suggests knowledge of the specifics of Tailwind (quoting from notes of the final May 1998 meeting):
"Q. And the CH3 got shot down that was supposed to get the chopper out - [i.e., the helicopter carrying Colonel Shungle that went down during Operation Tailwind]
A. Oh you know about that too."
Second, the AK Report states that "the reference to Admiral Moorer’s interview (which we have concluded cannot be viewed as constituting confirmation) itself may be said to have tainted the source’s ability to view the matter with the same distance that might otherwise have been the case." (AK Report, p. 33) The exchange at issue with the confidential source was as follows:
"Q. [Moorer] says that offensive use was justifiable because it saved American lives.
A. That is probably true."
We do not agree with the AK Report’s view that the source "may" have been tainted by this reference, for a number of reasons.
First, it does not sit with the fact that in an earlier conversation with April Oliver in September 1997, the source acknowledged that an agent stronger than BZ (hallucinogenic gas) was used on this mission and that its use was "not an unscrupulous thing to do." This was before Oliver had conducted any interview of Moorer, let alone had the opportunity to "taint" the source with any mention of it.
Second, during the meeting with Oliver in which she referenced Moorer’s position on offensive use, the source had already confirmed that GB, not BZ, was used on Tailwind, before Oliver made the reference to Admiral Moorer.
Third, Admiral Moorer’s statement mentioned to the confidential source was a general statement regarding the justification of the offensive use of nerve gas, not a reference to Moorer’s confirmation that it was used on Operation Tailwind, as suggested by the AK Report.
Fourth, this was a very well placed source who would be unlikely to be influenced so easily by such a brief and unspecific exchange. He is in a position to know the details of chemical weapons use in Laos and elsewhere during the Vietnam War, and his depth of knowledge was confirmed by SOG sources.
Finally, the representation by Oliver regarding Moorer’s position was accurate. This accuracy is shown, for example, by the following exchange from the May, 1998 interview with Admiral Moorer:
Q: And so prepping the camp with gas was part of the battle plan?
A: Fundamentally, what you described is aimed at saving American lives. I have no problem with it. So is collecting intelligence, eliminating defectors. I come back to the point — if an operation is necessary to keep the losses of Americans to an absolute minimum, and if that capability ensures a significant reduction or elimination of American casualties, I'd use it."
The AK Report states that "[a]t the very least, the degree of actual knowledge possessed by the source should have been probed in more depth." (AK Report, p. 33). Again, this source was in a very well placed position to have factual knowledge about chemical weapons use during the war in Vietnam and Laos. In the words of the AK Report itself, this source, "particularly knowledgeable about chemical weaponry, was intimately familiar with nerve agents." (AK Report, p7).
We mention the following other exchanges with this source not referred to in the AK Report, because they are relevant to the general SOG mission to kill defectors and to the wider use of CBU-15 (sarin nerve gas). These took place in the interview in May 1998 in which the source gave a thumbs up to the Tailwind script.
When asked whether getting defectors was a part of the SOG mission, the source replied:
"It’s a no brainer. You want to kill defectors. They are a huge embarrassment, particularly in context of the times with the antiwar movement. And they can be a big military problem, with the codes and language, and working with the
radios. . . ."
With respect to killing everything that moves:
"What that guy Van Buskirk tells you about anything that moves, no rules of engagement, is right on target. People don’t understand how callous we were in SOG. There were simply no rules."
With respect to CBU-15 being available for search and rescue missions:
"A. That’s my understanding. You want to make sure the pilot is upwind. And why not use it, if it gives him a chance. He’s only one guy, there’s lots of enemy. If you don’t use it, the pilot gets taken, the equipment gets captured. I don’t see anything wrong with it; the pilot has got to know it’s coming, and will scramble to the high ground and cover his face if he can. If he doesn’t make it, he wouldn’t have made it anyway.
Q. One A1 pilot told me he was involved in SAR operations and used it as many as 15 times. Multiply that by as many as 60 pilots.
A. I don’t know for sure how widespread it was though, it may be wider than I realize. Even in SOG, it may have been used more than I know. My friend, [name intentionally omitted] has told me of one use on a SOG operation. But he didn’t know it was nerve agent beforehand."
This kind of information is not being revealed because of the reference by Oliver to Admiral Moorer’s statement that the use of CBU-15 is justifiable to save American lives. Nor does it demonstrate any "reasoning" on the part of the source. It demonstrates knowledge.
FORMER SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL
This confidential source is a former senior military official, intimately familiar with SOG operations and Tailwind. His intimate knowledge is confirmed by multiple other sources. His credibility is not attacked by the AK Report.
With respect to this confidential source, the AK Report states that what was said by the source "is doubtless supportive of the broadcast but with some of the same problems we have seen elsewhere - - a producer overstating her case to the source and a source responding positively but with ambiguity to the producer." (AK Report, p. 34). As an example for this assertion, the AK Report quotes from an exchange that included a reference to letter from the Defense Department. The AK Report states that "the reference to it in an exchange with the source may well have affected the source’s view of the matter." (AK Report, p. 36).
As noted in the AK Report, this exchange occurred after the source had given April Oliver a "good deal of information indicating that he knew a good deal about Tailwind." (AK Report, p. 35.). In particular, in an earlier interview prior to any mention of the letter, this source confirmed that CBU-15 was used to prep the area in Tailwind, and that "Yes, absolutely" it was effective.
Furthermore, given the highly placed status of this source, we strongly believe that the reference to the letter did not affect the source’s view of the matter. The AK Report itself states that this source was a "former high ranking officer intimately familiar with SOG." (AK Report, p7). Had he requested to see a copy of the letter, we would have shown it to him.
With respect to the Defense Department letter itself, no reliance was placed on it by us for the broadcast, because, based on the copy we were given, we were unable to determine definitively whether the reference was to CBU-15 or CBU-25 or something else. The digits are too unclear to rely on them.
The AK Report assesses the source’s confirmation with the following statement:
"On the one hand, the source does state that CBU-15 was used in a ‘covert operation in Laos.’ On the other, the source may be responding in a hypothetical fashion. Then again, the source’s general refusal to answer questions directly may reflect nothing more than the special care used by people trained in ‘plausible deniability’ never to put themselves in a position where they can be damaged by the attribution of views to them." (AK Report, p. 38).
The particular exchange at issue is as follows from the May 1998 interview (we set it out in full, although it is also set out in the AK Report because the AK Report’s conclusions with respect to it are so far fetched) (emphasis added):
Q. Was Tailwind unique in the large number of lives that CBU-15 saved?
A. It was unique because of the agents used. I don’t think you can say it was unique because of the large number of lives saved. It would not have been used unless it had given us a significant advantage.
Q. And when you mean agent, you mean CBU-15, GB, right?
A. Remember it was a major decision to escalate to decide use of that agent. It was not risk free. But it was felt that it was unlikely that the NVA would complain. They were not supposed to be in Laos. They were unlikely to come to the United Nations and complain about the weapon.
Q. Because it would expose them being in Laos. That’s interesting. I have been scratching my head about that, about why they didn’t say something about this.
A. Well the NVA said the only troops they had in Laos were the Viet Cong. We frequently complained about how Sihanouk and others were in fact giving sanctuary to the NVA.
Q. Again we are on background here. So it was decided then that the agent CBU-15/GB could be used because the Vietnamese were unlikely to complain.
A. Yes, in a covert operation in Laos.
Q. Moorer has told us on camera that he never made a point of counting up the number of times CBU-15 was used. What do you make of that statement?
A. That it was used on missions at other times than on Tailwind is what I would interpret that as meaning.
Q. Do you know how many times?
A. Nope. I don’t know of anyone who would know that accurately.
Q. He has told us that the weapon was by and large available for search and rescues….was the weapon commonly available for SARs. Is that your understanding?
A. [Intentionally omitted — would indicate the source’s identity]
Q. Well I tried to pin Moorer down on dates. We have talked to about thirty A1 pilots at this point and they talk about using it from 1969 to early 1971. Were you aware of it being used on SAR missions at this time?
A. No I do not know of any use of it. [sentence omitted because would reveal sources identity].
Q. But we have already established that you know of the use of CBU-15 in this specific instance, on Tailwind. You have told me that in this conversation and before.
A. I am prepared to accept that. That’s something you seem to have right. You have enough basis to use that.
The AK Report concludes that "the source does state that CBU-15 was used ‘in a covert operation in Laos,’" but that "the source may be responding in a hypothetical fashion." (AK Report, p. 38). Any common sense reading of that exchange tells one that the source’s response was not hypothetical, and this kind of strained reading by the authors of the AK Report casts doubt upon their even-handedness.
The AK Report proceeds to state that:
"[t]he problem is that the source’s responses, although supportive, are ambiguous. They are, possibly deliberately, blurry. Such responses are not irrelevant. We repeat that they may properly be viewed as a whole as being supportive of the broadcast, but they are sufficiently ambiguous that they cannot be said to provide the full scale support for the broadcast that should have been demanded before it aired." (AK Report, p. 38).
We disagree with the AK Report. This source confirms that CBU-15 was used on Operation Tailwind and that the target of Tailwind was defectors (see also the confirmation set forth below, again not referenced in the AK Report).
After April Oliver reaffirmed that the interview was on "background," ["background" assures the source of confidentiality with respect to attribution] the May 1998 interview continued as follows (these exchanges are not referenced by the AK Report):
"Q. So the GB was available in Laos.
A. No, not in Laos, in Thailand. Both those bases [NKP and Udorn] are in Thailand.
Q. Right of course. I meant based in Thailand for use on SARs in Laos.
A. And North Vietnam. Sometimes American pilots would be shot down in the border area. They were always targets of attack along the Ho Chi Minh Trail."
And later:
"Q. We have a 1971 manual of chemical weapons and one of the things that is most impressive is the vast array of weaponized sarin in the arsenal. It comes in all forms, CBUs, clam shells, mortars. Was it ever used in these other forms besides CBUs?
A. Not that I know of. It was not used in rockets. Honest John had gone out by then. But it was available in artillery shells. There were medium sized howitzers that had chemical grounds.
Q. But there was no artillery in Laos.
A. There was artillery in Vietnam. But we did not take artillery in on covert ops. We might take a small mortar in some cases. I do not think they carried chemicals however.
Q. Sounds kind of dicey to carry on the ground. So the preferred delivery would by air? [sic]
A. Yes, we had control of the air. We could fly low and slow. We didn’t have to worry about radar and MIGs in Laos.
Q. So CBUs delivered by A1s.
A. Yeah that’s right.
Q. And the agent we are talking about here is CBU-15/GB?
A. Right."
And later after Oliver again reaffirms that the source is a "blind" source:
Q. So you understood the target of Tailwind to be defectors, and not POWs?
A. Defectors, yeah."
And later:
"Q. Just one last time, your own personal understanding of Tailwind is that it was a mission in which CBU-15, GB, was used at least twice on the village base camp and on extraction, and that the target was a group of American defectors.
A. You are not going to use my name on this are you?
Q. No, sir, you are on background as a senior military official.
A. Yeah. That’s my view."
THE MEN OF OPERATION TAILWIND
The AK Report begins with the following acknowledgement: "Men engaging in such activities [use of nerve gas and killing defectors], even under orders, would be unlikely to disclose them. When those same people have been trained to participate in "black" operations and to conceal those operations long after they were concluded, the process of newsgathering about them is all the more difficult." (AK Report, p. 4).
EUGENE McCARLEY
Captain Eugene McCarley was the commander of the commando company, called a hatchet force, on Operation Tailwind. The authors of the AK Report state that "McCarley was the leader of the unit being described and had flatly denied the thrust of the broadcast. His views were entitled to more prominent treatment." The AK Report states that "in an interview with us (and in numerous other interviews since the broadcast) McCarley has denounced his treatment on the broadcast. He states that after saying that the use of nerve gas ‘was possible,’ he then said that it had never been used by any of his troops, in fact, was not in the Vietnamese theater at all. He said, as well, that the mission had nothing to do with killing American defectors." (AK Report, pp39-40).
It should be noted that the authors of the AK Report did not, to our knowledge, screen the videotaped interview with McCarley. If true (and we cannot know for certain because we were denied the opportunity to meet with Messrs. Abrams and Kohler after they screened the tapes), we find this surprising, given the amount of emphasis they place on his information. That videotape shows many extraordinarily long pauses taken by McCarley in responding to questions, and his averting his eyes, which are not evident by reference only to the transcript of the interview.
The AK Report, while making unsubstantiated criticisms of the credibility of Admiral Moorer and Lt. Robert Van Buskirk, makes no reference at all to the state of Captain McCarley’s credibility with respect to Tailwind. The AK Report also states that "as the ground leader of the operation, [McCarley’s] views were entitled to significant weight" but does not address the fact that McCarley was not the de facto leader of the operation because he was wounded early in the mission. Finally, the AK Report misrepresents the certainty and consistency of McCarley’s statements.
McCarley’s Credibility
The AK Report selectively ignores certain facts regarding the credibility of McCarley’s statements. If McCarley had claimed that nerve gas was used and defectors were targeted and we had used him as much as we did (five times), the AK Report would have crucified us.
First, Van Buskirk, not McCarley, was the de facto leader of the mission because McCarley was wounded early on. It was Van Buskirk who led the attack on the base camp, called for the gas and was chosen to brief General Creighton Abrams on the operation. Van Buskirk is described by Corporal Craig Schmidt as the "key guy."
Second, Captain McCarley, by his own admission, stands ready to deny that the US military was ever in Laos, stating in the videotaped interview with him that:
"if operating across border [into Laos] is considered unethical or deniable, then I reckon I’m denying it."
This statement of adherence to SOG’s code of deniability cuts to the heart of McCarley’s lack of credibility on Tailwind and is not even mentioned in the AK Report.
Third, McCarley has, since the broadcast, made a number of easily demonstrable (by reference to the tapes and transcripts) misrepresentations about being taken out of context as well as inconsistent statements regarding the mission itself (some of them to Messrs. Abrams and Kohler who cite them in the AK Report). For example, he has asserted that atropine (the nerve gas antidote) was not carried on the mission, which is inconsistent with the information given by Rose and others on the mission.
It is worthy of note, given CNN’s allegations that we "fell in love with the story" and minimized contradictory information, that we chose not to emphatically discredit McCarley, omitting these statements and inconsistencies from the broadcast. It is also significant to note that the AK Report, while erroneously emphasizing Admiral Moorer’s age and Captain Van Buskirk’s purported (and debunked) "repressed memory syndrome" does not consider that these issues relating to McCarley’s credibility merit even a mention. McCarley by his own words will deny anything and everything that happened in Laos, in keeping with the SOG practice of plausible deniability.
McCarley apparently now also denies making certain statements which are reflected in April Oliver’s contemporaneous notes (AK Report, pp. 39-40.) Incredibly, despite these clear indications of McCarley’s lack of credibility with respect to Operation Tailwind and Mr. Abrams’ and Mr. Kohler’s willingness to make many judgments on credibility issues in their report, the AK Report states that:
"[w]hat McCarley said to the CNN producer and she to him is a matter of credibility about which we are unable to pass judgment. This is one of the few cases in which the producer’s notes — which totally support her version of what was said to her off camera — are flatly inconsistent with what an individual who has been interviewed claimed she said." (AK Report, p. 40)
This claimed inability to pass judgment is starkly at odds with the judgment passed on Van Buskirk and Moorer and inconsistent with the AK Report’s earlier conclusion that:
"[W]e do not believe it can reasonably be suggested that any of the information on which the broadcast was based was fabricated or non-existent. Contemporaneous notes made by the principal producer, April Oliver, are not only consistent with typed notes that she prepared immediately after her interviews, but in almost all cases with the later recollections of the individuals interviewed. The accuracy of the notes is strongly supported, as well, by the fact that they contain many passages which suggest less than complete or definitive confirmation of the broadcast by its sources and much inconsistent information. We rely upon many of those passages as a basis for our criticism of the broadcast." (AK Report, pp. 4-5)
But not, apparently as a basis of criticism of McCarley’s credibility.
Despite this purported inability to pass judgment on this issue, the AK Report sets forth McCarley’s post-broadcast complaints and statements and characterizes these statements as a flat denial without contrasting that position to Oliver’s contemporaneous notes or referencing what McCarley actually said according to those notes. Some of McCarley’s statements not referenced in the AK Report are set forth below.
What McCarley Said
Mr. Abrams said in CNN’s retraction broadcast on July 5, 1998:
"He’s not just a dissenter. I mean, this is the commander of the operation, saying, in so many words, ‘It wasn’t nerve gas.’ And your audience wouldn’t know that from this broadcast."
This representation of what McCarley said, by Mr. Abrams, is extraordinarily inaccurate. [Note: Mr. Abrams’ statement is also inconsistent with Mr. Abrams’ view, expressed in the CNN Retraction broadcast, that, "worst of all," Van Buskirk didn’t know what he was talking about with respect to the gas because he was on the ground.]
In April Oliver’s first cold call to Captain McCarley in September 1997, McCarley said:
"It’s very possible [it was nerve gas]." "I really don’t know what it was but the gas did the job." "It very well could have been nerve gas. We would have used anything to get out." "It wouldn’t surprise me to find out that a lethal nerve gas was used." "It is very possible [that nerve gas was used]. I can’t confirm or deny. I would have no problems with it being used. People all trash Vietnam vets so. But I think we would have used any weapon to get out alive."
In his on-camera interview in October 1997, McCarley referred to the gas as something like pepper spray. About a week after that interview, he called April Oliver saying that he didn’t want the on-camera interview used, and that the gas was stronger than pepper spray. This was an incapacitating gas, not a lethal gas.
None of this is referenced in the AK Report, which characterizes McCarley as "flatly den[ying] the thrust of the broadcast."
We do not suggest, and the broadcast did not suggest, that McCarley confirms that nerve gas was used, but it is clear that his statements were self-contradictory, inconclusive and destructive to his credibility on the subject. To include in the broadcast his statement that "I never, ever considered the use of lethal gas, not on any of my operations," without any reference to the contradictory statements set forth above would have been inaccurate and misleading. We therefore included the statement that McCarley told CNN off camera that the use of nerve gas on Tailwind was very possible and that on camera later he said, "I never ever considered the use of lethal gas, not on any of my operations." We believe this is a fair and balanced treatment of what he said with respect to nerve gas.
With respect to defectors, the broadcast stated that, "To this day, Captain McCarley denies Tailwind’s mission was to kill defectors, saying his orders were to draw enemy troops away from CIA mercenaries embattled nearby," and showed McCarley saying, "[w]e weren’t looking for any village. We had no idea that one was there and we stumbled upon it by accident." Again, this is a fair and balanced treatment of what Captain McCarley told us about defectors.
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